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PROPOSALS TO AMEND RULE 68TIME TO ABANDON SHIPt
Stephen B. Burbank*

It is no surprise that, having included "facilitating the settle
ment of the case" as one of the objectives of pretrial conferences
in the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 1 the Advisory Committee has turned its attention to
Rule 68. The Rule was intended to provide an incentive to settle
by requiring that a prevailing claimant who has declined a more
favorable offer of judgment pay post-offer "costs."2 But, in the
Advisory Committee's view, Rule 68 has proved ineffective. 3 The
concern, apparently, is not that too few civil cases filed in fedCopyright © 1986 by Stephen B. Burbank.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Visiting Associate Profes
sor of Law, University of Michigan (1985-86). A.B., 1968, J.D. , 1973, Harvard University.
I appreciate the comments of Owen Fiss, Laura Macklin, Tom Rowe, Linda Silberman,
and Roy Simon on a draft of this Article.
1. FED. R. C1v. P. 16(a)(5). See also FED. R. CIV. P 16(c) (7); infra note 12.
2. FED. R. C1v. P. 68 ("Offer of Judgment") provides in pertinent part:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to
be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect specified in his
offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the
adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may
then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof
and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding
to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the mak
ing of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not pre
clude a subsequent offer. . . .
3. The Committee states:
The principal reasons for the rule's past failure have been ( 1) that "costs,"
except in rare instances in which they are defined to include attorney's fees . . .
are too small a factor to motivate parties to use the rule; and (2) that the rule is
a "one-way street," available only to those defending against claims and not to
claimants. Moreover, some parties defending against claims for money are in
clined to delay making otherwise acceptable offers until trial so that in the in
terim they may have the use at favorable interest rates of funds that otherwise
would have been available to the offeree under an offer accepted at an earlier
time.
Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 68 advisory committee note, 98 F. R.D. 363-64 (1983); proposed
FED. R. CIV. P. 68 advisory committee note, 1 02 F. R.D. 433-34 (1984). For an economic
analysis of present Rule 68, developing theoretical explanations for the Rule's marginal
effectiveness, see Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1986).
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eral court are settled-less than seven percent of filed cases go
to trial-but, rather, that they are not settled promptly, entail
ing expense and delay for both the federal courts and the par
ties.4 Accordingly, the Advisory Committee has proposed to "put
teeth into"11 Rule 68, withdrawing its initial 1983 proposal in the
face of criticism and substituting a 1984 proposal designed to
blunt the force of that criticism.6 No surprise, perhaps, but some
of the rulemakers' basic premises in proposing amendments to
Rule 68 are questionable. The burden of this comment, however,
lies elsewhere. Both formal legal analysis and the politics of
court rulemaking counsel that the Committee, having changed
course, should now abandon ship.
As to the rulemakers' premises, the Chairman and Reporter of
the Advisory Committee have asserted:
Surveys over the last seven years reveal that our nation's
traditional dispute-resolution system is ill, principally
due to excessive delays and spiralling costs, often out of
all proportion to the amounts at stake or the issues being
litigated. Public complaints are too loud to be ignored.
No longer is middle-income America the sole complain
ant. Bar associations and corporate business enterprises
have joined the demand for better and less expensive
ways of resolving their disputes. If lawyers and courts are
to avoid public distrust of the system, changes are essen
tial. . . . The proposed amendments of Rule 68 are part of
an effort to meet public demand.7

4.

The Chairman and Reporter of the Advisory Committee explained:
The Advisory Committee recognizes that, although 93% of all civil cases in fed
eral courts never go to trial, the great majority of those settled are not disposed
of until shortly before trial, after long delays and excessive expense. The objec
tive of the rule should be to induce parties to talk settlement seriously at an
early stage and dispose of cases then. Early settlement would also give a claim
ant timely use of the funds received . . . .

W. Mansfield & A. Miller, Proposed Amendment of Rule 68: Background Memorandum
3 (Apr. 15, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Background Memorandum] (copy on file with U.
MICH. J.L. REF.).
Although one may accept the Advisory Committee's claim that the goal of the propos
als to amend Rule 68 is not to induce more settlements, that might well be their effect if
implemented. See infra text accompanying note 59.
5.

Background Memorandum, supra note 4, at 5.

6. See letter from Hon. Walter R. Mansfield [then Chairman of the Advisory Com
mittee] to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Aug. 1984), 102 F.R.D.
423, 424 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Mansfield letter]; Background Memorandum, supra
note 4, at 1. The 1984 proposal is reproduced infra note 20.
7.

Background Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
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Rejecting the alternative that nothing be done to amend Rule
68, the Chairman and Reporter have reasoned: "This course . . .
ignores the public's demand for some means of reducing exces
sive expense and delay in the use of federal courts as the tradi
tional dispute-resolution mechanism. It would force people to re
sort to some other, less reliable methods such as arbitration." 8
There is much of interest here. An historian of American pro
cedure would note the persistence of reform rhetoric, including
the emphasis on bar associations and corporate business enter
prises. 9 An historian would also be interested in the persistence
of hostility to arbitration.1 0 But no interest in history is needed
to ask whether the rulemakers have accurately perceived or de
scribed the problem of expense and delay in the federal courts, 1 1
or why settlement is among the "better and less expensive ways
of resolving . . . disputes" while arbitration is not. 12 Moreover,
one need not fully embrace Professor Fiss' eloquent plea against
settlement to wonder with him whether, "although dockets are
trimm€d, justice may not be done. " 1 3
In the 1983 proposed amendments to Rule 68, the Advisory
Committee sought a more effective incentive for parties to settle
cases promptly by making the proposed Rule available to all
parties, adding expenses and reasonable attorney's fees to the

8. Jd. at 8.
9. See, e.g., Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure Will Follow Simplification of Fed
eral Procedure, 76 CENT. LT. 207 (1913); Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and L egal
Procedure, 5 Kv. L.J. (No. 2) 3, 10-24 (1916). See generally Graham, The Persistence of
Progressive Proceduralism (Book Review), 61 TEx. L. R Ev 929 (1983). For a discussion
of contemporary reform rhetoric, see Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Conten
tious and L itigious Society, 31 UCLA L. R Ev 4, 6-11, 61-69 (1983).
10. As to disputants being "forced" to resort to arbitration, see, e.g., Taft, The De
lays of the Law, 18 YALE L.J. 28, 31 (1908); Shelton, Uniformity of Judicial Procedure
and Decision, 22 T H E LAW STUDENT's HELPER (No. 10) 5, 8 (1914); Shelton, The New
Era of Judicial Relations, 23 CASE & CoM. 388, 389-90 (1916).
11. Not everyone accepts at face value the rulemakers' assertion that "enormous de
lay and expense . . . marks [sic] dispute resolution in most federal courts." Mansfield
letter, supra note 6, 102 F.R.D. at 423. See, e.g., Silverstein & Rosenblatt, A Square Peg
in a Round Hole: The Application of Rule 68 to Awards of Attorney's Fees in Civil
Rights Litigation, 16 CoNN. L. R Ev. 949, 965 (1984); see also Levin & Colliers, Containing
the Cost of Litigation, 37 RuTGERS L. REv. 219 (1985); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer
& Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary L itigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72 (1983).
12. In addition to including "facilitating the settlemeDt of the case" as one of the
objectives of pretrial conferences, Rule 16, as amended in 1983, includes "the possibility
of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute" among the
subjects to be discussed at pretrial conferences. FED. R. C1v. P. 16(c)(7). Those in whose
path the writers of the memorandum were following, although distrusting arbitration,
thought that it had promise as a means of reducing burdens on the courts in certain
classes of cases. See, e.g., Taft, supra note 10, at 36-38.
13. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
.
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costs that are shifted, and providing for an award of interest.14
Opponents of that proposal claimed that it would violate the
Rules Enabling Act, u; that it was inconsistent with a variety of
federal statutes that permit an award of attorney's fees to a pre
vailing party, and that it would deter impecunious and contin
gent-fee plaintiffs from seeking relief.l6
The Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules cited the
widespread interest in the 1983 proposal as evidence 6f the ade
quacy of published rulemaking procedures.17 The question re
mained for the rulemakers, however: what to do? The
rulemakers knew that, if they persisted, they could expect con
tinuing and determined opposition. 18 That opposition could re
sult in congressional action to block the proposed amendments if
they were prescribed by the Supreme Court. Moreover, continu
ing controversy over Rule 68 could only strengthen the hand of
those seeking to amend the enabling acts.19 In a rational world,
the decision to scrap the effort or to proceed would have de
pended on the rulemakers' ability to make a persuasive response
to their critics and on an informed sense of the political climate.
The rulemakers did proceed, and we have a basis for evaluating
that decision from both perspectives.
Whereas the 1983 proposal retained the mandatory cost-shift
ing aspect of the existing Rule, adding expenses and reasonable
attorney's fees to "costs," with discretion in the judge to grant a
reprieve, the 1984 proposal invokes the language of "sanc
tions."20 What is in a word? A lot in this case, because that word
14. See proposed FED. R. C1v. P. 68 & advisory committee note, 98 F.R.D. 361-67
(1983); Background Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3-4.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
See Mansfield letter, supra note 6, 102 F.R.D. at 424; Background Memoran16.
dum, supra note 4, at 5-7; see also Note, The Impact of Proposed Rule 68 on Civil
Rights Litigation, 84 CoLU M. L. REv 719 (1984).
17. See Hearings on Rules Enabling Act (Oversight and H.R. 4144) Before the Sub
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 117-18 (1983-84) [hereinafter cited as Rules Ena
bling Act Hearings]. For the rulemaking procedures, see id. at 112-15; 98 F.R.D. 389-93
(1983). They were a long time in coming, see Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1021 n.l7 (1982), and credit may be due to previously expressed
legislative interest. See 129 CoNG. REC. H8031 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983).
18. After the Chairman and Reporter of the Advisory Committee came up with the
alternative that, as revised in minor particulars, was eventually published as the 1984
proposal, a meeting was held with some of those who had opposed the 1983 proposal.
Opposition persisted. Telephone conversation with Burt Neuborne, Legal Director,
American Civil Liberties Union (Sept. 20, 1 985).
19. See, e.g. , Rules Enabling Act Hearings, supra note 17, at 133-48 (statement of
Burt Neuborne); 130 CoNG. REC. H4104 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984).
20. RULE 68. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT; SANCTIONS
At any time more than 60 days after the service of the summons and complaint
.
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carries with it baggage the rulemakers hope will insulate them
from their critics. Various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure au
thorize the award of attorney's fees as a sanction for abuse of
the litigation process.21 The 1 984 proposal represents an attempt
to embrace that model, with the assurance of rulemaking valid
ity that it inspires,22 rather than the model of fee-shifting, with
on a party but not less than 90 days (or 75 days if it is a counter-offer) before
trial, either party may serve upon the other party but shall not file with the
court a written offer, denominated as a[n] offer under this rule, to settle a claim
for the money, property, or relief specified in the offer and to enter into a stipu
lation dismissing the claim or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly. The
offer shall remain open for 60 days unless sooner withdrawn by a writing served
on the offeree prior to acceptance by the offeree. An offer that remains open may
be accepted or rejected in writing by the offeree. An offer that is neither with
drawn nor accepted within 60 days shall be deemed rejected. The fact that an
offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. Evidence of
an offer is not admissible except in proceedings to enforce a settlement or to
determine sanctions under this rule.
If, upon a motion by the offeror within 10 days after the entry of judgment,
the court determines that an offer was rejected unreasonably, resulting in unnec
essary delay and needless increase in the cost of the litigation, it may impose an
appropriate sanction upon the offeree. In making this determination the court
shall consider all of the relevant circumstances at the time of the rejection, in
cluding (1) the then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim that was the
subject of the offer, (2) the closeness of the questions of fact and law at issue, (3)
whether the offeror had unreasonably refused to furnish information necessary
to evaluate the reasonableness of the offer, (4) whether the suit was in the na
ture of a "test case," presenting questions of far-reaching importance affecting
non-parties, (5) the relief that might reasonably have been expected if the claim
ant should prevail, and (6) the amount of the additional delay, cost, and expense
that the offeror reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be
prolonged.
In determining the amount of any sanction to be imposed under this rule the
court also shall take into account (1) the extent of the delay, (2) the amount of
the parties' costs and expenses, including any reasonable attorney's fees incurred
by the offeror as a result of the offeree's rejection, (3) the interest that could
have been earned at prevailing rates on the amount that a claimant offered to
accept to the extent that the interest is not otherwise included in the judgment,
and (4) the burden of the sanction on the offeree.
This rule shall not apply to class or derivative actions under Rules 23, 23.1,
and 23.2.
Proposed FED. R. C1v. P. 68, 102 F.R.D. 432-33 (1984).
21. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 11, 16(f), 26(g), 37(b).
22. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee has noted:
Our Committee, without taking any position regarding the validity of these
objections [to the 1983 proposal), believes that they are met by the present pro
posal, which is clearly procedural and does not provide for attorney's fee shifting
but authorizes imposition of a sanction based on the creation of unnecessary
delay and needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Mansfield letter, supra note 6, 102 F.R.D. at 424. See also proposed FED. R. C1v. P. 68
advisory committee note, 102 F.R.D. 436 (1984); W. Mansfield, Memorandum Re:
Whether the Proposed "Attorneys' Fee" Amendment of Rule 68 Complies with the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, at 4-6 (June 14, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Enabling Act
Memorandum] (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
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its troubling jurisprudence and the problems created by existing
fee-shifting statutes. 23
In addition, the rulemakers have moved from the mandatory
scheme of the existing rule, largely retained in the 1983 pro
posal, to a proposal conferring discretion on the trial judge
(1) whether to impose a sanction and (2) how much of a sanction
to impose. The 1984 proposal circumscribes that discretion by
enumerating considerations appropriate to each aspect of the
decision.24 Formally mandatory sanctions were a cornerstone of
the 1983 amendments to Rules 11 and 26.u' In formulating the
1984 proposal to amend Rule 68, the rulemakers recognized that
compromise on that score was a useful, if not a necessary, re
sponse to critics of the 1983 proposal. It remains to be seen
whether the response is sufficient.
Relatively few Supreme Court cases provide guidance on the
validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Hanna v. Plumer26
tells us that a Rule is constitutional if it is "rationally capable of
classification"27 as procedural or, in Justice Harlan's caricature
of the Court's test, if it is "arguably procedural."28 In other
words, if a purpose-or perhaps only effect-of a Rule is to or
der the process of litigation in federal courts, it is within the
constitutional power of Congress, delegated for these purposes
to the Court. This constitutional test, together with the Court's
language in Hanna erecting a presumption of validity for Fed
eral Rules,29 has for almost twenty years been the first resort of

23. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
Analytically, Alyeska is only marginally relevant, if it is relevant at all, because it con
cerned the allocation of lawmaking power between the federal courts adjudicating cases
and controversies and Congress. But many have argued that Alyeska also speaks to the
allocation of prospective lawmaking power concerning attorney's fees as between the Su
preme Court and Congress. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3032 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). For problems created by existing fee-shifting statutes, see infra
text accompanying notes 53-61, 73-75.
24. See supra note 20. The 1983 proposal did grant some discretion to the trial judge.
25. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11, 26(g); see also Burbank, Sanctions in The Proposed
Amendments to the Federul Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11
HoFSTRA L. REv. 997, 1009-10 (1983).
26. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (holding that FED. R. C1v. P. 4(d)(1) is pertinent and valid in
a diversity action).
27. Id. at 472.
28. !d. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. The Court in Hanna reasoned:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the
court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court has
been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the
Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judg
ment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling
Act nor constitutional restrictions.
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the rulemakers in responding to arguments that a Rule or pro
posed Rule is invalid. Unfortunately, it has usually also been
their last resort, and the resulting errors in analysis support the
view that the rulemakers simply do not care about legal limita
tions on the rulemaking enterprise.30 Thus, in their memoran
dum responding to critics of the 1983 proposal to amend Rule
68, the Chairman and Reporter of the Advisory Committee
stated:
Whether the August 1983 proposals exceed the Com
mittee's powers under the Rules Enabling Act ... is an
issue that can be debated ad nauseam without reaching a
clear-cut resolution. The Supreme Court has noted the
absence of any bright line between "procedure " and
"substantive right" as those terms are used in § 2072 . .
In Hanna the Court took the view that a federal rule
should be treated as presumptively procedural and up
held as such if it is "rationally capable of classification"
as procedural or is "arguably procedural."3 1
.

.

This analysis is wrong and wrong-headed. It is wrong because
the Court in Hanna did not intend its constitutional test to do
double duty, so that if it is satisfied, one need not even inquire
about validity under the Rules Enabling Act.32 It is wrong
headed because central to the Court's presumption of validity
was the premise that the rulemakers take questions of power se
riously.33 Whatever one may think of that presumption in the
context of adjudication, it has no proper place in the context of
rule formulation. 34 Both the Supreme Court and Congress have
a right to expect more of those to whom primary responsibility
for rulemaking has been entrusted.35
!d. at 471 (footnote omitted).
30. See Burbank, supra note 17, at 1132-37, 1194-95.
31. Background Memorandum, supra note 4, at 7 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 472 (1972); 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
32. See 380 U.S. at 464-65, 469-74; Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 693, 720 (1974); Burbank, supra note 17, at 1034.
33. See supra note 29. But see United States v. Abel, 105 S. Ct. 465, 468 (1984)
("[W]e are in truth merely a conduit when we deal with an undertaking as subst:mtial as
the preparation of the Fed. Rules of Evid.").
34. See Burbank, supra note 17, at 1132-37, 1155, 1178-79, 1195-96.
35. If the question of the 1983 proposal's validity was as close as subsequently repre·
sented, see supra text accompanying note 31, it is doubtful that those who shaped the
Enabling Act would have countenanced its publication.
Where a doubt exists as to the power of a court to make a rule, the doubt will
surely be resolved by construing a statutory provision [the Rules Enabling Act]
in such a way that it will not have the effect of an attempt to delegate to the
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In fairness, the Court in Hanna provided very little guidance
on the Enabling Act's limitations, indicating continuing willing
ness to adhere to the "test" set forth in Sib bach u. Wilson &
Co.36 "The test [of validity under the Enabling Act] must be
whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them."37 But, if only because Sib bach's language
contains so little determinative content and has hardly been
elaborated since 1941, it holds the potential for a narrowing con
struction by a court so inclined. 3 8 For example, if one shared
Professor Fiss' view of settlement generally and noted that the
1984 proposal is intended to discourage court involvement in the
process of settlement,39 one might question whether the pro
posed Rule "really regulates .. .the judicial process for enforc
ing rights and duties" or is not, rather, designed precisely to
abort that process.4 0
Rulemakers and commentators have long taken comfort in the
notion asserted by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee in
1983 that "[t]here is precious little legislative history bearing on
the Enabling Act, and the legislative history with respect to the
'substantive rights' proviso is virtually nonexistent."4 1 On the
contrary, there is an uncommonly rich legislative history, includ
ing hearings and detailed reports on a bill that, in all material
respects, was identical to the bill enacted in 1934. That history
reveals a purpose in the procedure/substance dichotomy to allo-

courts what is in reality a legislative function.
S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1926) [hereinafter cited as 1926 SENATE RE:
PORT]. See Burbank, supra note 17, at 1120.
36. 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (rejecting a challenge to the validity of FED. R. C1v. P. 35); see
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965) (quoting Sibbach).
37.
38.
39.

Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
See Burbank, supra note 17, at 1029 n.59, 1033 n.71, 1195.

See supra note 20.
40. See Fiss, supra note 13, passim. I do not believe this argument is only a play on
words, although Sibbach's mumbo-jumbo certainly encourages word play. Other Federal
Rules that "regulate" the process described by the Court in Sibbach b y cutting it short
contemplate sanctions for failure to abide by Rules and orders in aid of adjudication, see,
e.g. , FED. R. C1v. P. 41(b), or formal determinations that a party has no legal right to
proceed. See, e.g, FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b), 12(c), 56. But cf. FED. R. C1v. P. 16(a) (5) and
16(c) (7), which are not, however, by their terms coercive. Rules providing for mandatory
arbitration provide a good counter. But they are not Federal Rules, and local rules so
providing have been vigorously challenged. See Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in
Federal Civil Procedure: Federal Civil Rule 83 and District Court L ocal Rulemaking
Powers, 8 U. PuGET SouND L. REv. 537, 544-45 (1985).
41. Enabling Act Memorandum, supra note 22, at 3 (citations omitted) ; see also Bur
bank, supra note 17, at 1023-25.
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cate federal lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as
rulemaker and Congress, and provides a basis for limitations on
rulemaking that is consistent with congressional purpose.42
Under standards derived from the history of the Enabling Act,
it is not clear that the 1984 proposal is invalid. The key here is
discretion. Because it confers substantial discretion on the trial
judge, the proposed Rule might not be thought to have a pre
dictable and direct effect on rights claimed under the substan
tive law, such as the right to be free from discrimination in em
ployment.43 But there is evidence that those in Congress who
drafted and gave serious attention to the bill that became the
Enabling Act did not regard substantive law in this sense as the
only area to be avoided in or protected from supervisory court
rulemaking. The 1926 Senate Judiciary Committee noted that
"[s]ome of our most valued civil liberties have been obtained
through the creation by legislative edict of mere remedial
measures."44 In its view, the grant of rulemaking power did not
extend to "matters involving substantive legal and remedial
rights affected by the considerations of public policy."45 The
Committee included in the category of remedial choices thus re
served for Congress those that "define(] or limit[] . . . civil rights
. . . using that term in its broad sense."46 Viewed in the light of
this history, the 1984 proposal confronts serious difficulty. Ani
mating some statutory attorney's fees provisions, notably in the
civil rights area, is Congress' conviction that the vindication of
substantive rights is inextricably linked to arrangements for
fees.47 Even if the 1984 proposal were not thought to make
42. See Burbank, supra note 17, at 1035-1131. The Solicitor General's amicus curiae
brief in Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985), alerted the Court to the existence of
this research. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2526 n.19. But the Court sidestepped the Enabling Act question; see infra text accompany
ing note 67. Had the Court confronted the Enabling Act issue in Marek , it would have
been hard pressed to adhere to its previous interpretations. Sibbach and Hanna formu
lated the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy on the assumption that Congress was
concerned about the protection of state law. Marek involved only questions of the alloca
tion of federal lawmaking power.
43. See Burbank, supra note 17, at 1121-31; Burbank, supra note 25, at 1007-10.
44. 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 12.
45. !d. at 9. See Burbank, supra note 17, at 1121, 1125-31.
46. 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 10 (quoting 3 REPORT OF THE BoARD OF
STATUTORY CoNSOLIDATION ON THE SIMPLIFICATION oF THE CIVIL PRACTICE IN THE CouRTs
OF NEw YoRK 477 (1915)). See Burbank, supra note 17, at 1121-22, 1125-31.
47. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the bill that became 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982) observed:
All of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee
awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a mean
ingful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these
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choices, because it is discretionary, it would nonetheless lead to
alteration of Congress' arrangements in a predictable class of
cases.48
This is 1986, not 1934, and whatever view one takes of the
relevance or implications of the Enabling Act's history, we need
an interpretation of the statute that is adequate for present
needs and conditions. It is important but not sufficient to pro
tect existing "substantive legal and remedial rights."49 In addi
tion, attention should be paid to Congress' basic purpose to allo
cate federal lawmaking power. When federal lawmaking is
proposed that necessarily and obviously requires a choice be
tween policies that relate to the process of litigation and policies
that are extrinsic thereto, the choice should reside with Con
gress. The concern is that
if the rulemakers are left to make choices in such areas,
and whatever the purpose of the [procedure/substance]
dichotomy, they will choose to advance those policies
that are their special province and to subordinate those
that are not. To say Congress is likely to evince a similar
bias in the other direction is not an answer, whether the
concern is allocation of powers or federalism. 50

laws contain.
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to
enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private
citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the
Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must
have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in
court.
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1011].
Such "private attorneys general" should not he deterred from bringing good
faith actions to vindicate the fundamental rights here involved by the prospect
of having to pay their opponent's counsel fees should they lose . . . . Such a party,
if unsuccessful, could be assessed his opponent's fee only where it is shown that
his suit was clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harassment purposes . . . .
This bill thus deters frivolous suits by authorizing an award of attorneys' fees
against a party shown to have litigated in "bad faith" under the guise of at
tempting to enforce . . . Federal rights .. . .
ld. at 5 (citations omitted) .
48. See infra text accompanying notes 53-61, 71-72; see also Testimony of the Alli
ance for Justice on the 1984 Proposal to Amend Rule 68, at 23-29 (Jan. 28, 1985), re
printed in Rules Enabling Act of 1985: Hearing on H.R. 2633 and H.R. 3550 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Judiciary
Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 132-42 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985 Rules Enabling Act
Hearing] (suggesting that statutory attorney's fees provisions confer a substantive right
within the meaning of the Enabling Act).
49.

See supra text accompanying note 45.

50.

Burbank, supra note 17, at 1191-92 (footnotes omitted).
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Lest it be thought that this is merely an academic concern,
consider the rest of the response by the Chairman and Reporter
of the Advisory Committee to objections made to the 1983 pro
posal to amend Rule 68:
In response to the contention that the proposed amend
ments conflict with Congress' intention to encourage pri
vate enforcement of certain laws by providing an award
of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party," it should be
noted that the Supreme Court has construed such laws as
permitting an award of attorney's fees in favor of a de
fendant against a plaintiff who prosecutes an action that
is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" .
.

.

.

Although rejection of an offer of settlement cannot be so
characterized, Congress might well view promotion of
settlement by award of fees as something to be en
couraged, particularly when the rejection is unreasona
ble under the circumstances.
The contention that the proposed amendments would
deter impecunious and contingent-fee plaintiffs from
seeking relief from the court is somewhat exaggerated.
On the opposite side of the ledger is the enormous unnec
essary legal expense that must be incurred by defendants
as a rE:sult of rejection of reasonable offers, following
which the plaintiff either settles for the identical amount
on the eve of trial or recovers less or nothing after trial.
Some consideration must be given to the party who is
hurt financially by such conduct.51
Whether one considers this response in the context of reinter
preting the Enabling Act or, passing questions of power, in the
context of rulemaking prudence, it is obvious that at least one
range of policies implicated in this lawmaking calculus is far re
moved from the domain of procedural expertise.52
From either the power or prudence perspective, the 1984 pro
posal presents a closer question than its predecessor. That pro
posal, however, has not wholly eschewed choice, either of policy
or of the means to implement it. Rather, the rulemakers have
determined that, in some circumstances, the means chosen by
Congress to advance its policy choices in various attorney's fees
statutes should be displaced in order to advance the policy of
51. Background Memorandum, supra note 4, at 7-8 (emphasis added).
52. Cf. Burbank, supra note 25, at 1011 (policies implicated in decisions about sanc
tions for litigation conduct).
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avoiding expense and delay. Put another way, the 1984 proposal
would redefine the relevant policies and would empower federal
judges to reach compromises different from those reached by
Congress.
When Congress determines that (1) a prevailing plaintiff
ought ordinarily to recover attorney's fees from the defendant,
as a means to stimulate the enforcement of substantive norms
and the vindication of substantive rights,53 and that (2) a pre
vailing defendant ought not ordinarily to recover such fees from
the plaintiff, lest plaintiffs with plausible claims be deterred
from asserting them,154 Congress is making choices. Moreover,
they are choices that are informed by an awareness of distribu
tional inequalities-the effect of which is inevitably to prevent
many defendants from recouping moneys spent on "unnecessary
legal expense."1515 The Advisory Committee apparently takes the
view that the Enabling Act authorizes a rule empowering federal
judges to displace the second means chosen by Congress to
achieve its policy objectives, so long as the first is preserved and
so long as the sanction label can be applied to the means chosen
by the Advisory Committee to pursue its policy objectives.56 The
Committee's reliance on the trial judge's discretion to "assure
that sanctions under this rule do not frustrate the various poli
cies of the statutes"157 provides little comfort.58 Although the
1984 proposal might not deter potential plaintiffs from bringing
actions, risk aversion as a result of their lack of resources and
uncertainty on the sanctions question might very well induce
them to accept settlement offers they reasonably deemed inade
quate.59 The perception of this problem alone warrants rejection
of both the Advisory Committee's implicit premise that settle
ment is an adequate substitute for adjudication,60 and its specu-

53. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 47, at 4; Newman v. Piggie Park Enters.,
390 u.s. 400 (1968).
54. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 47, at 5; Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
55.

See supra text accompanying note 51.

56.
57.

See proposed FED. R. C1v. P. 68 advisory committee note, 102 F.R.D. 436 (1984).
ld.

58. See Silverstein & Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 964; cf. Note, supra note 16, at
731-33 (discretion under the 1983 proposal).
59. Cf. Fiss, supra note 13, at 1076 & n. 12 (effect of 1983 proposal on distributional
inequalities). See generally Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, LAw
& CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter, 1984, at 139, 164-70.
60. See Silverstein ,9,z_ Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 960-61; Note, supra note 16, at
740. The problem of distributional inequalities is not the only reason to reject the pre
mise. See also Fiss, supra note 13.
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lation that Congress would so regard it.61
When a Federal Rule confers substantial discretion on the
trial judge, it is hard to understand why an exercise of that dis
cretion should not be required to be consistent with federal stat
utes-that is, treated like federal common law.62 For the pre
sent, of course, Congress must take the distinction very
seriously, because, unlike a federal common law rule, a valid
Federal Rule supersedes a previously enacted federal statute
with which it is inconsistent.63 This was not the problem in
Marek v. Chesny,64 which involved the interplay of existing Rule
68 with a subsequently enacted statute.65 Moreover, for those
who, in considering or reconsidering the 1984 proposal, are in
clined to take comfort from the Court's decision in Marek,66 it is
worth noting some other obvious distinctions. The majority
opinion in that case, holding that the "costs" to which Rule 68

61. See supra text accompanying note 51; Note, The Conflict Between Rule 68 and
the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Statute: Reinterpreting the Rules Enabling Act, 98
HARY. L. REV. 828, 839 n.58 ( 1 985); see also Miller, supra note 3, at 106-08.
Professor Redish has aptly pointed out:
Usually, the federal courts have been provided jurisdiction for a purpose, and
any reduction in either their jurisdiction or in litigant access to the courts will
itself impose a cost. Moreover, if one myopically focuses upon the administrative
dangers caused by docket size, one is likely to accept most judicial attempts to
curb those dockets, for the very reason that they have that effect.
Redish, Book Review, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1378, 1386 (1985).
62. See Burbank, supra n ote 17, at 1193 & nn. 762-63; cf. Ilro Prod. Ltd. v. Music
Fair Enters., 94 F.R.D. 76, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (local rule).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 ( 1 982). Representative Kastenmeier's mo3t recent bills to
amend the enabling acts specifically prohibit supersession. H.R. 2633, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2(a) (1985), reprinted in 1985 Rules Enabling Act Hearing, supra note 48, at 95;
H.R. 3550, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1985), reprinted in 1985 Rules Enabling Act
Hearing, supra note 48, at 104. I support that decision because of doubt that general
supersession provisions entail substantial practical benefits after the 1948 revision of the
Judicial Code, conviction that they entail substantial practical costs by putting pressure
on Congress to block proposed Federal Rules, and concern that they are unconstitutional
under I mmigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See Prepared
Statement of Stephen B. Burbank Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Admin. of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm. 2-7 (June 6, 1985) , reprinted in
1985 Rules Enabling Act Hearing, supra note 48, at 8-13; see also letter from Stephen B.
Burbank to David Beier, Esq. (Sept. 20, 1985) , reprinted in 1985 Rules Enabling Act
Hearing, supra note 48, at 280-82 (arguing that notions of "inherent judicial power" are
an impediment to clear thi n k ing in this context and suggesting a distinction between
general supersession provisions and supersession provisions that iden tify the statutes to
be superseded).
The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3550 on December 9, 1985. 131 CoNe. REc.
H11,399 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1985).
64. 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985).
65. The statute at issue i n Marek was the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
66. See Miller, Justices Again Focused on ,Jurisdiction and ,_r;'ees, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 2,
1985, at 8-16.
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refers include attorney's fees awardable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
does not mention the Enabling Act.67 Further, even assuming
the majority's analysis is intended, sub silentio, to address the
issue,68 that analysis simply does not reach the 1984 proposal to
amend Rule 68. It is one thing to conclude, in the case of a pre
vailing civil rights plaintiff who has refused a more favorable
settlement offer, that the denial of that party's own post-offer
attorney's fees is consistent with section 1988 and does not vio
late the Enabling Act.69 It is quite another matter to conclude
that, under the Enabling Act,70 a Federal Rule can validly em
power a federal judge to order ( 1 ) a prevailing civil rights plain
tiff to pay the defendant's attorney's fees or (2) a losing civil
rights plaintiff whose suit or its continuation was not "frivolous,
vexatious or . . .for harassment purposes"7 1 to pay the prevail
ing defendant's attorney's fees. 72
Finally, even though the Enabling Act's supersession provision
renders consistency with federal statutes irrelevant as such, that
question would likely be of interest to Congress if the 1984 pro
posal to amend Rule 68 were laid before it. According to the

67. See Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3014-18 (1985). Compare id. at 3031-32
(Brennan, J . , dissenting) (addressing the Enabling Act question).
68. Judge Posner's opinion for the Court of Appeals included the alternative holding
that, interpreted to include attorney's fees as "costs" in a case governed by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1982), Rule 68 would violate the Enabling Act. Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474,
479 (7th Cir. 1983), reu 'd, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985).
69. The questions are analytically distinct. See infra note 70. In Marek, however,
§ 1988, the statute with which Rule 68, interpreted to include attorney's fees, was
claimed to be inconsistent, was also the claimed source of substantive rights. In my view,
the Court was probably correct in holding that "costs" as used in Rule 68 includes attor
ney's fees where a statute so provides. See letter from William D. Mitchell to Hon.
Charles E. Clark (Oct. 13, 1937) (Charles E. Clark Papers, Yale University Library, box
111, folder 58). Moreover, in light of the Court's cases tying the award of attorney's fees
under § 1988 to ''the degree of success obtained," Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
436 (1983), there was no necessary inconsistency between Rule 68 and the statute, and
similarly no necessary abridgment or modification of substantive rights-assuming rights
to attorney's fees are such. See Simon, Rule 68 at the Crossroads: The Relationship
Between Offers of Judgment and Statutory Attorney's Fees, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 889, 90305 (1984). The problem from both perspectives is that Rule 68 is mandatory, while an
award of fees under § 1988 is discretionary. See Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3028
( 1 985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). When Rule 68 would deny a plaintiff post-offer attor
ney's fees to which he would otherwise be entitled under § 1988, as interpreted in Hens
ley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) and other cases, the latter should control.
70. Assuming the constitutionality of the supersession provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2072,
but see supra note 63, an amendment to Rule 68 need not be consistent with previously
enacted statutes, unless those statutes make choices reserved to Congress under the Ena
bling Act that would be affected by the amendment.
71. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 47, at 5.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48, 53-61; see also Marek v. Chesny, 105 S.
Ct. 3012, 3023-24 (1985) (Brennan, .]. , dissenting).
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Court in Marek, in considering section 1988, Congress sought to
ensure "that civil rights plaintiffs obtain 'effective access to the
judicial process' "7 3 and was concerned that they "not be penal
ized for 'helping to lessen docket congestion' by settling their
cases out of court."74 Under the 1 984 proposal, it is foreseeable
that, because of distributional inequalities and the uncertainty
bred by the large discretionary element in the proposal, some
civil rights plaintiffs would feel compelled to accept inadequate
settlement offers. Surely Congress would notice what had hap
pened to "effective access to the judicial process." And surely
Congress would remark how its concern that civil rights plain
tiffs not be penalized for settling had been twisted into a war
rant to penalize them for not settling.76
Legislation introduced by Representative Kastenmeier to
amend the enabling acts has been chiefly directed to process re
forms.76 But, in introducing one of his bills, Representative Kas
tenmeier made clear his beliefs that the 1 983 proposal to amend
Rule 68 "would have crossed the line from procedural to sub
stantive,"77 and that "Congress conferred a substantive right by
enacting the Civil Rights Attorney Fee Award Act. "78 Given the
weakness of the rulemakers' response to objections prompted by
the 1983 proposal, including both their analysis of those objec
tions and the alternative proposed in 1984, the decision to pro
ceed was a mistake. The question remains whether, recognizing
that it would be possible to amend Rule 68 in ways that did not
raise serious questions about validity or inconsistency with stat
utes,79 the Committee should again change course. Unfortu-

73. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3017 (1985) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 429 (1983) and H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong . , 2d Sess. 1 ( 1976)).
74. !d. at 3018 (quoting H.R. RE P. No. 1553, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976)).
75. The pressure on Congress to block a proposed Federal Rule promulgated by the
Supreme Court because it is inconsistent with a federal statute is one of the costs of
general supersession provisions. See supra note 63.
76. See H.R. 6344, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1 984); H.R. 2633, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); HR. 3550, 99th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1985); supra note 63. But see HR. REP. No. 422,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-23 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985 HousE REPORT] (limitations
on supervisory court rulemaking).
77. 130 CoNG. REc. H4104 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984).
78. !d. at 4105 n.3. The Act was there cited as an example of a statutory provision
not subject to supersession by a Federal Rule. See also 1985 HousE REPORT, supra note
76, at 13. A task force for which the Reporter of the Advisory Committee also served as
reporter recently concluded that "fees represent a substantive right created by Congress
that should not be compromised." C O U RT AWARDED A TTO R NEY FEES, REPORT OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FoRCE 22 ( 1985), reprinted in 108 F.R.D. 2:37, 256 ( 1 986).
79. Indeed, many features of both the 1983 and 1984 proposals are of this type. See
proposed FED. R CIV. P. 68 & advisory committee note, 98 F.R.D. 361-67 (1983); pro
posed F E D . R Civ. P. 68 & advisory committee note, 102 F.R.D. 432-37 (1984) .
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nately, the experience to date suggests that, where Rule 68 is
concerned, the Committee has great difficulty limiting its
agenda. That experience also suggests that any proposal that is
not merely mechanical will provoke serious controversy, whether
or not warranted. "Common prudence should tell the rulemakers
that reaching for too much may cost them everything."8 0 In this
case, the rulemakers should be guided by awareness that "every
thing" may include more than Rule 68. 8 1

80. Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REv. 275, 301 (1962).
81. At the end of Juiy 1985, Representative Kastenmeier sent Judge Frank Johnson,
the new Chairman of the Advisory Committee, a letter that included the following
paragraph:
I would like to put you and the Members of the Committee on notice that I
am very concerned about proposed changes to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. I have reservations about whether any of the proposed modifi
cations should be statutory or through the rules process. Due to the institutional
importance of this subject to the legislative branch, my tentative feeling is that
legislation to modify Rule 68 should be introduced, thereby squarely placing all
issues on the legislative platter. Such legislation will be drafted after the August
Congressional recess . . . .
Letter from Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier to Hon. Frank M. Johnson, Jr. (July 31, 1985)
(copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
I t has been reported that Judge Johnson cancelled a November meeting of the Advi
sory Committee in response to this letter but that "Rule 68 is still on the committee's
agenda for its next meeting in April." Legal Times, Oct. 14, 1985, at 4, col. 3. Indeed, the
Chief Justice has recently observed:
Most commentators believe that R'..ll e 68 should have more teeth; some are con
cerned that it not have too many. The Judicial Conference Advisory C o m mittee
on Civil Rules will continue the careful study of the Rule and various alterna
tives. Somehow we must develop a workable solution to assure that those who
cause unwarranted delay and expense will be subject to some kind of sanctions.
W. Burger, 1985 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 12 (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L.
REF.).
On December 19, 1985, Representative Conyers introduced a bill providing that " the
fourth sentence of rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is amended by in
serting ' (as defined in section 1920 of title 28, United States Code)' after ' costs'." H.R.
3998, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The bill accomplishes Representative Kastenmeier's
objective of putting amendments to Rule 68 "on the legislative platter." Letter from
Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier to Hon. Frank H. Johnson, supra. Moreover, if enacted, it
would overrule Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 301 2 (1985). Finally, the bill provides addi
tional evidence, were it needed, of congressional determination, as well as adequate justi
fication, were it needed, for the rulemakers to sail another ship.
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